Why Mearsheimer’s Realist Take Is So Exasperating

  • You are deeply misinterpreting Mearsheimer's conclusion in your piece. He's not saying that NATO has a responsibility to not upset Russia - He's merely (accurately) noting that expanding the West's sphere of militaristic and social influence right up to Russia's borders has led to a clash between conflicting interests. Both sides are responsible for furthering their own agendas, and the agendas are incompatible when they meet. This is Mearsheimer's point; if we didn't want conflict in Europe, we should not have run toward it.

    Further, I think you could do with giving Russia more credit than you do - Suggesting that they are a declining power because 'all they have is a large portion of the world's energy reserves, and one of the few nuclear arsenals that shapes the world's geopolitics' is more than a little stretched, even if I see what you're shooting for.

    It's worth remembering the chaos they have successfully sown in US and European politics over the past 5 years, along with the effective interference they have run in the West's Middle East policy while assessing Russia's level of power in the world.

    Nonetheless, I have been interested to see how much debate he has caused in such a short time - We need more lightning rods like this!

  • > The Soviet Union lost the Cold War decisively. Its empire fell into pieces, its regional alliance disappeared, and most of its former allies joined NATO. Russia lost, and the Western alliance won. Given this, it is not NATO’s responsibility to protect Russian state security interests. It is Russia’s responsibility to give wide berth to NATO, recognizing—as every realist should—that the strong do what they will, the weak do what they must.

  • The issue is not that we don't understand Russias security concerns. Everyone understands that now. We just can't comply with Russias demand. Russia wants write the security policies of over 100 million people. No one is going to agree with that.

  • I'm skeptical of the idea that anything having to do with NATO is the true motive for Putin in this. It makes little sense to me given his actual statements about NATO with regard to the Russian invasion, and strategically makes little sense in terms of potential costs to their current endeavors. Why would you make 3/4 of your conventional military critically vulnerable to an adversary that you have publicly stated is unquestionably superior, by provoking that adversary, to increase security against said adversary?

    I've always suspected this is about securing access to Crimea and natural resource rights in eastern Ukraine: water access was cut to Crimea following 2014, and natural resource deposits have been discovered in the east. I suspect NATO is just a rhetorical excuse, to justify it to the world and domestic audiences.

    It also explains why the western campaign has been so ineffectual, and the Eastern one so relatively brutal. Yes, the east is easier to access by sea and less central to Ukraine, but I suspect a land bridge to Crimea, and securing natural resource rights, was the primary objective all along. Russia might have been accurate all along when they insisted they didn't want to occupy Ukraine per se or change the government, in the sense they just wanted to annex the east, and the west is just a diversionary tactic and/or secondary goal in service of the primary.

    It's also why I suspect Russia will consider this a win if they extract a land bridge as a "compromise" to obtain peace.

    All of this I'm saying as someone who'd rather see Russia out of everywhere that was undisputed Ukrainian territory in, say, 2000.

    All this discussion of NATO expansion is just falling into Russia's rhetorical trap they set.

  • Still haven’t seen a solid critique of Mearsheimer’s thesis and I’m starting to believe that maybe there won’t be one…

    I think one of the confusing points is trying to approach these events from a moral or “who’s to blame” point of view which is maybe important when attributing war crimes, calculating reparations or even giving us someone to hate if the world should end.

    But the key aspect should be outcomes. And his thesis is quite simple: if you push a major power, they will push back hard - just as sure as the sun will rise tomorrow. So the solution’s also quite simple: if you don’t want the outcome, don’t take actions that lead to it. He’s said it right in the New Yorker article at the end - strategy trumps morality.